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Using the Schumpeterian notion of Creative Destruction, this paper discusses the role
of antitrust in the process of economic reform and illustrates with the Latin American
case. According to that notion, competition is a process wherein firms strive to survive
under an evolving set of rules that engenders winners and losers. The main instrument
that allows firms to be ahead of their competitors is the introduction of informational
asymmetries that may result either from technological innovation, rent seeking or orga-
nized crime. To the public authorities this process implies two challenges. The former
is to identify the situations that require intervention and the latter is to ensure that
innovation will be the only available instrument for creating informational asymmetries.
I. Introduction
Over the present decade, a difficult task for Latin American governments has been
to maintain a coherent stance throughout the process of economic reform. Stabilization,
trade liberalization, and privatization were meritorious goals of the new policies launched
in the region since the late eighties. But in those cases where the government was unable
to remove itself from special interests, the reforms turned into short lived monetary
anchors, erratic trade policies, and badly regulated private monopolies; the end results
were unemployment, increased social inequalities, decadent public services, low rates of
economic growth, and a currency crisis.
This paper was prepared for the Second Meeting of the FLACSO/IDRC project Leading Issues
in International Trade Relations/Latin American Trade Network, Buenos Aires, June 16-18,
1999. I am grateful to Caldwell Harrop, Barbara Kotschwar, and Patrick Low for helpful
comments.
** Jos6 Tavares is a consultant to the Trade Unit of the Organization of American States (OAS).
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Using the Schumpeterian notion of Creative Destruction, this paper discusses the
peculiar role of competition policy-here defined in the narrow sense of antitrust-in
the process of economic reform. As any public policy, antitrust is constantly submitted to
several potential failures, especially those linked to regulatory capture. But it can render
two important services to an open developing economy; a set of rules that guides the
competition process toward efficiency and fairness and a mechanism that may protect
ihe national interest from anti-competitive practices originated elsewhere in the world
economy. To set the stage for the discussion, section Two briefly recapitulates the Schum-
peterian approach to competition and indicates the core of the policy agenda derived
from this approach, in which the antitrust authority is compelled to act as the regula-
tor of last resort in the economy. Section Three presents the domestic challenges faced
by the newly created Latin American and Caribbean antitrust agencies, while section
Four deals with cross-border issues at four levels: bilateral, subregional, hemispheric, and
multilateral. Section Five concludes.
II. On Schumpeter, Contestability, and Antitrust
Nowadays, the most widely accepted economic approach to competition is the one
proposed by Joseph Schumpeter, who defined competition as a dynamic process wherein
firms strive to survive under an evolving set of rules that constantly produces win-
ners and losers. In this process, the basic instrument that allows firms to be ahead of
their competitors is the introduction of informational asymmetries. Depending-upon the
momentary set of rules, such asymmetries may result from three types of entrepreneurial
activities: technological innovation, rent seeking, and organized crime (Baumol, 1990).
The above approach has a peculiar record in the history of economic thought.
Schumpeter revised it several times throughout his professional life. His 1912 book, The
Theory of Economic Development, established the links between innovation and compe-
tition. His 1928 paper, The Instability of Capitalism, highlighted the transient character
of competition conditions. The influence exerted by innovations in the rhythm of eco-
nomic activities was extensively documented in his book entitled Business Cycles (1939).
Finally, in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942), the random frequency of tech-
nical progress and its interplay with competition patterns were brilliantly synthesized
under the notion of creative destruction, which is a process of industrial mutation "that
incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the
old one, incessantly creating a new one." (1976, p. 83, italics in the original).
Despite the heuristic power of these analytic tools, the Schumpeterian approach
remained far from the mainstream of academic research for many decades. But this sit-
uation has changed rapidly since the late 1970s, due in part to the work done by Nelson
and Winter (1982), and nowadays, "Schumpeter's assertions inspired what has become
the second largest body of empirical literature in the field of industrial organization,
exceeded in volume only by the literature investigating the relationship between con-
centration and profitability" (Cohen and Levin, 1989, p. 1060). The beginning of this
new phase coincided with another important event: the debate engendered by the theory
of contestable markets-developed by Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982)-which argues
that industry structure is determined endogenously and simultaneously with the vectors
of industry outputs and prices.
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Schumpeterian competition and contestability theory provide a broad view of the
issues related to industrial organization and a challenging agenda for public policy.
According to this view, industrial growth results from the interaction among technology,
market size, and competition strategies. Efficiency can be compatible with any design
of industry structure. In every industry, the available technologies will imply a certain
degree of scope and scale economies and a specific ratio between transaction costs and
production costs, which in turn will define whether the most efficient structure is a
diversified set of firms, an oligopoly, or a monopoly. Due to the process of creative
destruction, these industrial configurations are, in principle, temporary, including their
entry barriers and the corresponding disciplinary power of potential competition.
The policy agenda derived from these theories contains two interconnected chal-
lenges. The former is to identify the situations that require intervention and the respec-
tive policy instruments to be applied. While the competition process generates technical
change and economic growth, there is no guarantee that the public interest is being
served, since entry barriers, asymmetric informafion, and market power are natural
ingredients of that process. So, the antitrust authorities are constantly on a borderline
position, where the reasons for intervening are as attractive as those for doing nothing.
As Demsetz noted:
In a world in which information is costly and the future is uncertain, a firm
that seizes an opportunity to better serve customers does so because it expects to
enjoy some protection from rivals because of their ignorance of this opportunity
or because of their inability to imitate quickly. [...J To destroy such power when it
arises may very well remove the incentive for progress. This is to be contrasted with
a situation in which a high rate of return is obtained through a successful collusion
to restrict output; here there is less danger to progress if the collusive agreement is
penalized. (1973, p. 3)
This is a convincing point often made by the Chicago School. As Easterbrook argued in
the same vein,
the hallmark of the Chicago approach to antitrust is skepticism. Doubt that we
know the optimal organization of industries and markets. Doubt that government
could use that knowledge, if it existed, to improve things, given the ubiquitous
private adjustments that so often defeat public plans, so that by the time knowledge
had been put to use the world has moved on. (1992, p. 119)
However, a dominant position acquired through a cumulative sequence of successful
innovations can be long lasting, and if the antitrust authority is absent the firm may
easily venture into abusive behavior whenever the opportunity arises. Hence, skepticism
must be blended with a dose of cautious activism.
The latter policy challenge is to ensure that innovation will be the only available
instrument for creating informational asymmetries; that is, that rent seeking and orga-
nized crime have been effectively removed from the menu of competition strategies.' In
1. The magnitude of this challenge has been well described by the U.S. authorities: "Our recent
international cartel prosecutions have demonstrated that even a century of vigorous antitrust
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fact, if this task were fully accomplished the former challenge would turn into a rare
event, and competition policy would probably lose its relevance. Rent seeking oppor-
tunities may arise either from asymmetric information engendered by the competition
process, whereby the public authorities are captured by special interests, or from policy
priorities independently defined by the government. Similarly, the room for organized
crime is directly related to the lack of market transparency and the amount of gaps in
the regulatory framework. Therefore, antitrust authorities are not only supposed to be
immune to regulatory capture but also strong enough to repress such practice elsewhere
in the public sector whenever required, acting as a dependable regulator of last resort in
the economy.
In this ambiguous environment, one usual prescription for antitrust action is the
removal of entry barriers, especially those created by the government. According to
Armentano, for instance,
abusive monopoly is always to be associated with governmental interference in
production or exchange, and such situations do injure consumers, exclude sellers,
and result in an inefficient misallocation of resources. But importantly for this
discussion, such monopoly situations are legal, created and sanctioned by the polit-
ical authority for its own purposes. All such legal restrictions on cooperation or
rivalry should be repealed. Thus, ironically or intentionally, the bulk of the abusive
monopoly in the business system has always been beyond the scope of antitrust law
and antitrust policy. (1996, p. 3)
Likewise, Singleton suggested that competition policy should focus its efforts "first and
foremost, on eliminating government-created entry barriers; second, on minimizing nat-
ural barriers; and third on prohibiting anti-competitive, entry deterrence by dominant
firms" (1997, p. 4). Albeit important, removing entry barriers is just one topic among
many others on the competition policy agenda and, evidently, is not a panacea. There
are situations in which part of the problem is precisely the lack of entry harriers. As
Rashid (1988) showed, quality has a clear tendency to deteriorate in industries with a
large number of small firms and low entry barriers.
III. The Latin American and Caribbean Context
The promotion of economic development is a national priority in every Latin Amer-
ican or Caribbean country. The role of competition policy in this endeavor is to com-
plement the governmental actions in the areas of education, science, and technology by
creating a market environment in which firms can only survive if they are following the
international rhythm of technical progress. The region's experience with import substi-
tution policies provides a good illustration of this point. A well-known feature of these
growth strategies was the lack of R&D investments by the private sector. Even in those
countries that started ambitious public programs of science and technology in the sixties
enforcement has not brought an end to cartel behavior on a grand scale. It is for this reason
that DOI recently has asked Congress to increase maximum corporate fines for price-fixing,
bid-rigging, and market allocation to $100 million" (U.S. Government, 1998, p. 12).
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and seventies, such as Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico for instance, the private sector did
not fulfill the government's expectations.
Likewise, the innovative behavior of domestic firms can also be used as a benchmark
to measure the success of a trade reform. If, after a certain period, import competition
has only led to trade deficits, destruction of local supply, and no formation of endoge-
nous sources of technical change, this will imply that the government has just replaced
one group of inconsistent policies with another. Indeed, a normative prescription to be
extracted from the analytical framework discussed in section Two is that the provision
of a coherent set of rules and incentives is a crucial assignment for the government in a
world of volatile competition conditions.
The enactment of new laws and the creation of autonomous antitrust agencies in
many Latin American countries during the nineties have been important initial steps
toward that set of rules and incentives. These new institutions are now forging their pub-
lic image and preparing themselves to act as regulators of last resort in those economies.
At the present stage, their two principal challenges are, first, to introduce a clear-cut divi-
sion of functions between the competition policy authority and the sectoral regulatory
agencies; and, second, to curb rent seeking opportunities within a domestic scenario of
unfinished economic reforms.'
This is a situation where the identification and eventual removal of entry barriers
would imply a major improvement of the competition conditions. However, in contrast
with the United States, Canada, and the European economies, where any student can
read an extensive theoretical and empirical literature on this subject (see Schmalensee
and Willig, 1989; Geroski and Schwalbach, 1991; Sutton, 1991; Caves, 1998), 1 have been
unable to find a single economy-wide study on Latin American entry barriers. So, while
the advice to promote market contestability became a platitude in the discussion about
competition policy in developing countries, it has been useless thus far, at least in Latin
America, because nobody has the relevant information about the existing entry barriers
and their economic consequences.
The typologies suggested by Salop (1979) and Singleton (1997) are useful starting
points for an assessment of these barriers. Salop distinguishes an innocent entry barrier,
which is unintentionally erected as a side effect of successful innovations, from those
strategic obstacles purposely invented to avoid potential competition, while Singleton
highlights the importance of government-generated entry barriers. In policy-oriented
research, it is convenient to introduce two additional subdivisions: temporary versus
long-lasting restrictions and regulatory versus protectionist barriers. The former subdivi-
sion provides a time dimension for the competition policy agenda, and the latter sep-
arates the governmental measures that are imposed to protect the public interest from
those actions that respond to special interests.
After identifying the relevant barriers across the economy, the next step is to analyze
their consequences, which consists essentialy of inquiring whether the affected sectors
are following the international patterns of productivity, profitability, and product dif-
ferentiation. With the information gathered through this exercise the antitrust agency
will be, at last, prepared to foster market contestability in some selected areas of the
2. For an illustration of these challenges in the case of MERCOSUR countries, see Tavares De
Araujo and Tineo (1998).
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economy. The exercise may also include a cost benefit analysis of each entry barrier,
indicating the firms, social groups, and geographic regions affected by that restriction.
This would allow the development of a competition advocacy program at a national
level, mobilizing other public and private institutions in a collective effort to overcome
the existing market distortions.
One stimulating example of the results that can be obtained through this type of
exercise is the recent paper by Djankov and Hoekman (1998). Although not using the
above-mentioned typologies, they studied the current conditions of competition in the
Slovak Republic by reviewing a set of indicators such as entry and exit, import com-
petition, profitability, revealed comparative advantage, concentration indexes and size
distribution of firms. They also presented a brief description of the policies implemented
by the government since 1992 in the areas of antitrust, trade, foreign investment, and
privatization. This description highlights a fundamental aspect of the Slovak experience,
which has been the role played by the competition office as regulator of last resort in
the economy: "In 1995, the office issued over 200 comments on proposed and existing
legislation and decrees; initiated 37 cases against government agencies (mostly provin-
cial and municipal); reviewed 230 privatization deals; and investigated 141 cases dealing
with potential anti-competitive practices. Of the latter, 39 dealt with horizontal practices
(collusion, cartels, etc.), 77 involved allegations of the abuse of a dominant position,
and 25 focused on proposed mergers. Most of these cases centered on the behavior of
(public) utilities" (Djankov and Hoekman, 1998, pp. 1111-12).
The common goal of these actions is to engender a coherent set of market incen-
tives, avoiding those situations whereby the government fosters competition through one
channel and creates market distortions through another, as has been so typical in Latin
America for many decades. And the results have been well documented by Djankov and
Hoekman. Nowadays, the conditions of competition across industries in Slovakia are,
in most cases, similar to those prevailing in Belgium, while less than a decade ago the
former country had a closed and highly concentrated industrial system. The average rate
*--- --- 1.. L-- -fI-L
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In their concluding remarks, Djankov and Hoekman stress the importance of eco-
nomic indicators as competition policy instruments:
Comparisons between industrial structures of roughly similar countries may be
useful in establishing a benchmark for changes in the conditions of competition
that prevail in a given economy. Clearly the value of such information would be
enhanced the greater the number of countries for which data is compiled. Incorpo-
ration of descriptive statistics on concentration, import penetration, or price-cost
margins for all WTO members in trade policy review reports would provide poli-
cymakers and analysts with a better sense of differences in market structure across
countries, as well as information on the evolution of trends across countries than
is currently the case. (p. 1126)
For Latin America and the Caribbean these databases would be critical both to strengthen
the existing antitrust agencies and, more importantly, to frame the public debate in those




Among the members of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) project, the
international aspects of competition policy are being treated nowadays at four overlap-
ping levels: bilateral, subregional, hemispheric, and multilateral. Bilateral cooperation
among antitrust agencies has been pursued mainly by the United States, which signed
agreements with Canada, Australia, Germany, and the European Union. Typically these
agreements cover the following procedures: (a) Mutual notification of enforcement activ-
ities that may affect the interests of the other country, including both anti-competitive
practices and mergers3; (b) Officials of either competition policy agency may visit the
other country in the course of conducting investigations; (c) Either country may request
that the other initiate an investigation in its territory on anti-competitive practices that
adversely affect the interests of the former country; (d) Mutual assistance in locating and
securing evidence and witnesses in the territory of the other country; and (e) Regular
meetings to discuss policy changes and exchange information on economic sectors of
common interest.
Bilateral agreements constitute a partial attempt to cope with the growing num-
ber of antitrust cases with cross-border implications. In the United States, for example,
about 30 percent of the investigations carried out in 1997 by the Department of Justice
involved multinational firms that often had operations in over twenty countries, while in
1993 only 10 percent of the cases had international dimensions. In recent years, nearly
50 percent of the merger cases reviewed by the Federal Trade Commission required con-
tacts with foreign antitrust agencies (see U.S. Government, 1998, p. 4). Anti-competitive
practices by multinational corporations usually imply significant damages to the public
interest, as the two following cases illustrate. The citric acid cartel was controlled by
four firms-Bayer, Hoffman-LaRoche, Jungbunzlauer, and Archer Daniels Midland Co.
In an operation involving annual sales of about U.S.$1.2 billion worldwide, these firms
pled guilty to price fixing and sharing the sales of citric acid in the United States and
elsewhere during the period July 1991-June 1995. As of March 1998, the U.S. criminal
fines imposed on this conspiracy were over U.S.$140 million and other private actions
were pending (see U.S. Government, 1998, p. 7). In the case of aluminum, Higgins et al.
(1996) have estimated that the international cartel created in 1994 was able to extract
over $1 billion from U.S. consumers in less than one year of transactions under that
arrangement.
Besides the European Union and the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Rela-
tions Agreement (CER), bilateral agreements are the only existing binding mechanisms
for dealing with cross-border anti-competitive behavior (see Lloyd and Vautier, 1999).
The ongoing discussions at other forums such as, inter alia, the WTO, FTAA, NAFTA,
MERCOSUR and the Andean Community may eventually lead to effective instruments
in the near future, but they are not yet ready to be applied at this moment, as discussed
below. However, bilateral agreements have two evident limitations: they do not curb
anti-competitive actions originating in third countries and they ignore the interests of
3. Notifications shall be sufficiently detailed to enable the notified Party to make an initial
evaluation of the effect of the enforcement activity on its own important interests, and shall
include the nature of the activities under investigation and the legal provisions concerned.
Where possible, notifications shall include the names and locations of the persons involved.
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the rest of the world. As Falvey and Lloyd (1999) have argued, there are instances in
which the maximization of global welfare is not compatible with the short run interests
of the nation in which the anti-competitive conduct originates, and this conflict requires
multilateral cooperation to be solved.
To start a debate on these issues, the WTO set up the Working Group on the Inter-
action between Trade and Competition Policy in December 1996. In the following two
years, about 170 governmental papers were presented to this working group, covering a
substantive agenda that goes well beyond the relationship between trade and competi-
tion. Despite the active participation of practically all WTO members that have antitrust
laws, this debate has been limited by two types of constraints. The former is that any
meaningful multilateral treaty on competition rules would only be enforceable if all-or
at least the vast majority of-WTO members had national laws covering the relevant
topics included in that treaty. The latter is that the present design of the WTO is prepared
to deal essentially with government conduct, whereas the major focus of competition
policy is the behavior of firms. As Lloyd (1998) observed:
A multilateral system with the WTO acting as an international competition author-
ity would need to investigate private actions in markets. Competition law in this
form, by comparison with international trade law, is extremely intensive in its
requirement of facts relating to the nature of competition, market share and so on.
These vary from case to case and require detailed investigations. When the markets
concerned in a case are international, this investigation would require information
from different countries. There must be doubts concerning the ability of a remote
centralized multilateral authority to understand behavior in markets, and in markets
located in different countries to boot:' (pp. 1143-44)
Several suggestions have been made in recent years to improve this situation (see
Scherer, 1994; Fox and Ordover, 1997; Jacquemin et al., 1998). The set up of a small and
autonomous International Competition Policy Unit (ICPU) was proposed by Jacquemin
et al. Located in Geneva and working in close coordination with the WTO, the ICPU
would be focused on the long run convergence of international competition policy stan-
dards. The preliminary steps toward multilateral negotiations on this subject would
include the strengthening of the network among antitrust authorities, which has been
initiated by the WTO working group; substantive discussions on how to deal with the
global effects of anti-competitive behavior; identification of the points of convergence
and divergence among the existing national laws; and a program of technical assistance
to help those countries that do not have competition policy at present.
While a multilateral system is not in place, regional trade arrangements may provide
an interim solution, since the harmonization of the competition conditions inside the
integration project is a natural priority for the member countries. Within the FTAA pro-
cess NAFTA is the most advanced agreement in this direction, because all the members
already have antitrust agencies. Although it does not include any formal commitment on
policy harmonization, a natural development of the present situation would be the acces-
sion of Mexico into the 1995 U.S.-Canada cooperation agreement. Moreover, as noted by
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Tavares De Araujo and Tineo (1999), the convergence in the area of merger regulation is
already well advanced. The Andean Community and MERCOSUR also have provisions
on competition policy, but they still need some amendments to become operational, as
pointed out by Jatar and Tineo (1998) and Tavares De Araujo and Tineo (1998).
One ordinary issue in the inquiry about the international aspects of competition
policy is the participation of small developing economies, which most often do not have
antitrust agencies. In Latin America and the Caribbean some small countries such as
Costa Rica, Jamaica, Panama and Peru already have these institutions, while others like
the Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Guatemala and El Salvador are preparing
their respective laws. Considering the challenges impinged upon the antitrust authority
by the Schumpeterian process of competition, the scant empirical knowledge on the
contestability of markets in the region, and the precarious state of the contemporary pol-
icy instruments for dealing with cross-border issues, one attractive option for the other
small FTAA economies would be to follow the attitude of Hong Kong and Singapore,
which decided against the adoption of antitrust laws, under the argument that free trade
is sufficient to promote competition in their domestic markets (see Lloyd, 1998).
However, the foregoing discussion suggests that this option is not convenient, for
three reasons. First, as argued in section Two, anti-competitive behavior is not related
to the size of the economy but to some characteristics of the competition process, espe-
cially asymmetric information, entry barriers, and market dominance. Indeed, as I have
reported elsewhere (Tavares De Araujo, 1998), in the American experience of antitrust
enforcement, most cases could have happened in any small open economy, and, very
likely, with greater damaging effects on the public interest. There is no doubt that trade
liberalization is a powerful instrument, but it is not sufficient to eliminate all the relevant
market distortions. Second, large flows of monopoly rents can be extracted from small
countries by international cartels, mergers and acquisitions through foreign direct invest-
ment and the growth strategies of transnational corporations. The available evidence
shows that this is not just a theoretical possibility but also a growing trend in the world
economy. In the absence of antitrust institutions, these facts seldom become objects of
public scrutiny. Third, nearly all Latin American and Caribbean countries belong to sub-
regional projects of economic integration, which contain explicit commitments on the
harmonization of the competition conditions. If these commitments were transformed
into operational mechanisms they could provide a timely alternative for those countries
that do not have antitrust laws. In the case of the Andean Community and MERCOSUR,
after the necessary improvements in the Decision 285 and the 1996 Fortaleza Proto-
col, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay could use these regional instruments as
their antitrust agencies. Eventually, on a later stage, they might set up national agencies
whenever the practical experience indicates that this would be the best option. If similar
procedures were adopted by SIECA and CARICOM, seventeen countries would benefit.'
4. Among the members of the Central American Common Market, four countries would be
included: El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua; and thirteen from CARICOM:
Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti,
St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Surinam, and Trinidad
and Tobago.
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V. Conclusion
In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, the policy agenda derived from the
Schumpeterian approach to competition includes both complex assignments and simple
tasks, ready to be implemented, which would pave the way to the former goals. The
enactment of a coherent set of market incentives that would lead to economic growth
and less inequality in the region depends upon mature institutions that result from
a collective learning process on the management of public resources. Removing trade
barriers, selling state firms, and even fiscal reforms can be done over a couple of years,
if there is political will. But setting up instruments to regulate a newly open economy
is a cultural event that implies the development of subtle notions such as credibility,
accountability, and fairness. Without these notions the distinction among innovation,
rent seeking and organized crime is meaningless, for example. And the same happens
with the concept of regulator of last resort, and so on.
Two initial steps into this long-term endeavor were identified in this paper: the
research on market contestability and the improvement of sub-regional antitrust mech-
anisms. If economic indicators like those used by Djankov and Hoekman (1998) were
available for all countries in the Western Hemisphere they would meet several domestic
demands-from competition advocacy to technology policy-and would be instrumental
for multiple foreign policy goals-from bilateral cooperation to WTO negotiations. Pro-
moting sub-regional mechanisms would yield complementary results, by strengthening
the existing antitrust agencies, by filling an institutional gap in twenty-two countries, and
by highlighting the convergence among the different levels of international negotiations.
Interestingly, in competition policy there is no room for debates such as regionalism ver-
sus multilateralism, or FTAA versus sub-regional arrangements. All of them are necessary
under the present conditions of the world economy.
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